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An overlapping generations model incorporating returns to  specific
experience is  used to demonstrate how  three  salient
phenomena in land-scarce developing countries--the predominance of  inter-
generational family extension, cost advantages of family relative  to hired
labor,  and  the  scarcityof  land  sales--may  be  manifestations  of  an  optimal
implicit contract between generations which maximizes the gains  from farm-
specific, experientally obtained knowledge.  A method for estimating the
contribution to agricultural profits of the farm experience embodied in
elderly kin based on a three-year panel of household data from India is
proposed and implemented.  Implications of the theory  for market transactions
in land and for  family extension are also tested using individual farm
data and time-series  information on rainfall.I.  Introduction
Three  important  characteristics  of  rural  areas  in  many  land-scarce
developing countries are the prevalence of  families which are extended
across  generations,  the profitability  of  family  relative  to  hired  labor,
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and  the dearth of market transactions in land.  While  a  number of separate
explanations for each of these phenomena have been offered  in  the literature,
little attention has been paid  to the possible  interrelationships  between
family  structure,  family  labor  profitability  and  the  land  sales  market.  Most
of  these explanations, moreover,  are based on the assumption of  some market
failure.  In  particular,  the  lower  shadow  value  of  family  labor  has  been
1959J
attributed  to  labor  market  imperfections  [Mazumdar  ,while  recent  theories
of  the  family  have  focused  on  the  role  of  that  institution  as  a  substitute
for absent capital  or  insurance markets.  Willis  [1979], for example,
formulates a model which characterizes the intergenerationally extended
family  as  an  entity  that,  in  the  absence  of  asset  markets,  provides for
elderly members whose subsistence requirements exceed  their household  and
market  productivity.  This  "old  age  security"  model,  however,  takes  as  given
rather than explains  the absence of  asset  (land) markets.  Moreover, since
there  are  no  private  incentives  for  children  to  serve  as  the  sole  source
of  support for  the unproductive elderly, it  is necessary that the young
be  obligated in  some ad  hoc way to make such transfers.
Kotlifoff  and  Spivak  [1981]  provide  a  rationale  for  intergenerational
transfers by demonstrating the optimality  of mutual bequest-consumption
arrangements when lifetimes are uncertain and  annuities markets are incom-
plete.  While  it  is  shown that prospects of  bequest may provide the  incen-
tives for the young to  support the  old  in  the absence of  altruism or  "norms",
the annuities model must rely on  "monitoring" costs to  explain why sucharrangements are only made by co-resident agents and cannot readily explain
the  predominance  of  intergenerational  extension  over  other  family  forms  in
South  Asia  or  account  for  the  absence  of  market  transactions  in  the  principal
family  asset,  land.  Cain's [1982]  rationale  for  the  existence  of  the  extended
(large)  family,  based  on  the  advantages  of  intrafamily  occupational  diversification
in economically risky environments, also fails to account  for the dominance
of  the  intergenerational  extended  form  and  assumes  the  absence  of  capital  markets..
A second approach, analogous  to Becker's theory of marriage  [1973] ,
might base the coresidence of old and young workers on production complemen-
tarity in agriculture;  thus the optimal sorting of  the age-specific labor
force  across  farms  is  one  which  matches  elders  with  offspring.  While  one  ad-
vantage of  this hypothesis  is  that  its assumption is  testable  in the context
of agriculture,  it  does not fully explain why the labor force on farms,
whatever its age composition, tends to consist  of persons who are kin or why
market  land  transactions  are  rare.  None  of  these  hypotheses  about  the  family
have  seen empirical  application.
In  this  paper  we  explore  an  alternative  theory  in  which  the  predominance
of  intergenerational  extension,  family  labor  profitability  and  the  scarcity
of land sales are manifestations of an optimal implicit contract between
generations  which maximizes  the  gains  from  (farm)  family-specific,  experi-
enctially-obtained  knowledge.  In  contrast  to  other  theories,(1)  no  assumptions
are  required  about  capital  or  land  market  imperfections,  (2)  the  economic
basis for  such family  labor and land  arrangements (the returns  to  specific
experience) can be measured, and(3) testable implications are readily derived.
A traditional agricultural setting with constant  technology is
considered  in which the experienced elderly can supply information about
the  most  efficient  techniques  for  coping  with  previously  experienced  varietiesof  adverse  weather,  techniques  which  are  likely  to  have  a  farm-specific
component.  The  principal  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  obtain  estimates  of
this  component  of  the  value  of  family  specific  experience  and  to  test  for
its  importance  in  explaining  the  incidence  of  land  sales  and the spatial  varia-
tion  in  family  structure.  In  section  II  we  show  how  the  existence  of
returns  to  specific  experience  creates  incentives  for  intergenerational
contractual  arrangements  among  family  members  in  developing  country  agricul-
ture.  In  section  III  we  propose  and  implement  a  method  for  estimating  the
contribution  to  agricultural  profits  of  the  farm-specific  experience  embodied
in  elderly  kin  based  on  a  three-year  panel  of  household  data  from  India.
as  well  as  the  income  diversification  theory
The  implications  of  the  specific-experience  theory/for  market  transactions
in  land  and  for  family  extension  are  tested  using  individual  farm  data  and
time-series  information  on  rainfall  by  district  covering  thirty  years  in
section  IV.  Section  V  summarizes  the  results  and  discusses  the  implications
of  these  findings  for  the  relationship  between  family  structure  and  economic
development.
II.  Returns  to  Specific  Experience  and  Family  Arrangements  in  Agriculture:
Theoretical  Implications
intergenerational
To  establish  the  linkage  between/family  extension,  preferences  for
family  over  hired  labor  and  intergenerational  and  intrafamily  transfers  of
land,  we  incorporate  specific  experience  into  a  simple  overlapping  genera-
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tions  framework.  Assume  that  each  individual  agent  lives  three  periods,
as  a  child  "laborer"  in  a  family  that  owns  land  of  size  A  and  as  an  adult
laborer  who  lives  two  periods  (young  and  old).  In  the  first  two  life-cycle
periods  no  land  is  owned  by  the  individual  but  land  may  be  purchased  in  the
second  period  out  of  savings  from  which  a  return  is  earned  in  the  third  period.4
Each parcel of land  in the economy is  sufficiently unique such that the value
of  output  is  incremented  by  p  per  unit  of  land  for  each  period  an  adult
works  on  that  land  and  by  ap  (0<a<l)  after  the  first  (child)  period  because
of  information  accumulated  through  experience  about  that  land.  We  assume
that  land  is  a  non-depreciable  asset  and  that  there  are  perfect  markets
for  the  two  factors  of  production,  land  and  labor. 4   The  latter  assumption
and  the  certainty of length of  life are adopted, not because they are
necessary  for  the model,  but  to  demonstrate  that  the  existence  of  returns
to  specific  experience on land  is  sufficient  to explain bequests  (of land)
to offspring and joint  old-young production by kin.  We also assume  that
relations among adult kin are non-altruistic and that  ownership rights
in  land  cannot  be  transferred  involuntarily;  they  can  be  sold  or  left  as
bequests  at  death.
We now show that an implicit contract between generations of_ the  same
family involving transfers of  land and use of family labor are Pareto effi-
cient compared to anonymous  (nonfamily) sales of land and labor.  Consider
first  the life-cycle  stream of  income for adults who choose not to work on
the family farm after period 1.  In the first adult period  (period 2),  the
incomes of the young, who work in the labor market for a wage W and purchase
an  amount  of  land  A  in  the  land  market  at  per-unit  price  p  (the  price  offered
by agents without  experience on that  piece of land),  are Y2, where
(1)  Y  =  W - pA.
In  the  next  period,  total  income  Y3  is
(2)  Y3  =  W +  (r  +  p  +p)A, (2)  3where  r  is  the  competitive  per-unit  return  on  land,  equal  to  the  rent  for
land  offered  by  agents  without  experience  on  that  land.  The  land  is  sold  by
the  end  of  the  period  and  the  rate  of  return  on  the  land  transaction  is  thus
(r+p)/p.
If  the  young  work  on  the  same  land  in  period  two  on  which  they  worked
as  a  child  in  period  1  and  purchase-that  land,  income  in  the  third  period
f
would  be  Y3 , where
f
(3)  Y3  =  W +  (r  +  p'  +  p)A
and  p'  =  (1  +  a)p  ,  since  work  experience  on  that  specific  parcel  of  land
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yields  the  return  p'.  As  Y  >  Y3 ,  the  farm  family's  offspring  thus  has
an  incentive  to  purchase  the  family's  land,  having  accumulated  experience
during  the  first  (child)  period  on  the  family  farm.5  Thus,  as  long  as  "own"
children  acquire  specific  experience  on  the  family's  land,  that  land  is
worth  more  to  offspring  than  to  any  other  agent  in  the  economy.  However,
the  maximum  extra  returns  p(l  +  a)A  to  purchasing  the  family  land  will  only
be  earned  if  the  offspring  also  work  on  that  land  during  the  second  period,
prior  to  the  time  when  land  ownership  is  assumed;  offspring  will  thus  have
an  incentive  to  induce  the  owners  of  the  land  (parents)  to  employ  them  on
the  (family)  farm  and  will  accomplish  this  by  entering  into  an  agreement
whereby  an  amount  E  above  the  per-unit  market  value  of  the  land  will  be  paid
during  period  two  conditional  on  their  being  employed  on  the  land.
If  such  a  contingent  contract  is  made  every  period  between  each  genera-
tion,  the  total  income  agents  expect  in  the  third  period  will  be
f*  f
Y3  >Y3  >Y 3 ' where
f(  Y (4)  Y3  =  W +  (r  +  0'  +  p  +  C)Aand  net  income  in  the  second  period  will  be
f*
(5)  Y*  =  W - (p  +  c)A.
The  rate  of  return  to  this  transaction  is  (r  +  p')/(p  +  c)  which  will  be
higher  than  the  market  return  to  investments  in  nonfamily  land  as  long  as
(6)  (  -)  =  >e r  +  p  r+_--
The  left-hand  side  of  (6)  sets  the  upper  bound  c*  on  the  additional
payments  made  by  the  young  to  their  old  parents  over  and  above  the  (anony-
mous)  market  value  of  the  land  p  and  equals  the  total  "rents"  to  be  shared
intergenerationally  as  a  consequence  of  the  land-labor  contract.  These
rents  will  be  higher,  and  thus,  the  gains  to  such  a  contract  greater,  the
higher  are  the  returns  to  specific  experience  p,  since
dc*  2  6 (7)  E*--  =  par/(r  +  p)  >0.
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The  existence  of  returns  to  specific  experience  thus  creates  incentives
for  farm  offspring  to work  on  the  family  land  when  young  and  to  purchase
that  land;  the  older  parents  are  provided  a  pecuniary  incentive  to  employ
their  offspring  and  to  transfer  the  family  land  to  them.  The  net  cost  of
family  labor  will  always  be  lower  than  other  laborers  since,  given  the
land-specific  experience  acquired  by  or  provided  to  the  (working)  children,
young  offspring  will  always  offer  a  higher-value  contingent  contract  than
young  non-kin.  The  predominance  of  intergenerational  familial  (nonmarket)
transactions  in  land  and  labor  does  not  arise  from  imperfections  in  land,
labor  or  information  markets.  Rather,  the  young  are  the  highest  market
bidders  for  their  parents'  land.
The  strength  of  the  bonds  linking  selfish  family  members  in  production
and  in  the  transfer  of  land  thus  depend  critically  on  the  value  of  p.
In contrast to  such concepts as "norms" or  "monitoring costs,"  however,the  returns  to  specific  experience  pertain  to  production  and  can  in  principle
be  measured  given  estimates  of  the  production  technology.  In  the  next  section
we  implement  methods  for  estimating  one  component  of  the  returns  to  experience
in  the  context  of  agricultural  production  under  adverse-weather  conditions.
III.  Estimating  the  Returns  to  Specific  Experience  in  Agriculture
A.  The  Data  and  Estimation  Framework
The  fundamental  notion  underlying  the  specific-experience  hypothesis
with  respect  to  family  structure  and  intergenerational  transfers  in  a
traditional  agricultural  setting  is  the  accumulation  of  useful  information
or  knowledge  with  age  which  is  most  valuable  when  applied  continuously  on
particular  parcels  of  land.  In  this  section  we  attempt  to  estimate  directly
the  returns  to  such  specific  experience  in  an  environment  with  stagnant
technology  but  where  there  are  many  "states  of  nature"  which  occur  with  some
likelihood  of  repetition.  In  particular,  we  hypothesize  that  elders  in
'traditional'  agriculture  can  provide  location-specific  information  about
the  allocation  of  resources  which mitigates  the  effects  on  farm  profits  of
adverse  states  of  nature  and  which  is  superior  to  that  provided  by  the  young.
Because  of  the  shorter  life  spans  of  the  young  relative  to  the  elderly,
the  latter  are  more  likely  to  have  directly  observed,  and  thus  to  have
acquired  more  information  about,  any  currently  experienced  state  of  nature.
To  estimate  the value  of  that  information,  we  utilize  a  data  set  consisting
of  a  three-year  panel  of  2900  Indian  rural  farm  households  surveyed  by  the
National  Council  of  Applied  Economic  Research,  the  Additional  Rural  Incomes
Survey  (ARIS).  These  data,  covering  the  years  1968-71,  provide  household  infor-
mation  for  each  of  the  three  years  on  farm  profits,  agricultural  inputs  and
demographic  characteristics  and  indicate  whether  or  not  weather  conditions
adversely  affected  crops  in  the village  in  which  each  household  resides.8
To  estimate  the  experiential  value  of  the  elderly  in  adverse  weather,
let  profits  for  farm  i  in  village  k  in  a  particular year  be  given  by  (1)
(8)  Tik  - e  i'  k  s  H X  (1-k
where  the  Zi  are  individual  farm  factors  (including  elders)  and  the  Ak
are a  set  of  village-level  factors  valuable  in  reducing  the  effects  of
adverse  weather  on  farm profits.  The  Xi  are  the  set  of  all  farm  and  loca-
tion-specific  fixed  factors,  including  possibly  some  Zi,  which  influence
profits  under  all  states  of  nature with  wk the  index  of  adverse  weather  in
the village.  The  Y  function  thus  embodies  the  hypothesis  that  certain
factors  are  especially  useful  in  adverse  weather;  the  parameter  e  represents
the  proportional decline  in  the  contributions  of  the  fixed  factors  to profits
due  to  sub-optimal  weather.  Under  good  weather  conditions  y  =  0.
In  estimating  a  profit function  such  as  (8),  a  major  problem  is
the  presence  of  unobserved  farm-specific  fixed  factors  Xi,  such  as  entrepre-
neurial ability,  which  may  be  correlated  with  the  observed  factors,  such  as
the  Zi  and  Xk.  However,  if  we  define,  for  convenience,  good  weather  as
Wk =  0,  the  profit  function  (8)  in  adverse  weather  can  be  written  as
(9)  Tr  = e  (Zik;wk)G  (I (9)  Tik =  e  k  G  (1-mk ik  [ik
Given  the  panel  nature  of  the  data,  since  we  know,  for  most  farms,  profits
G  TB
under  good  (TG)  as  well  as  adverse  (t )  weather  conditions  it  is  thus  not
necessary  to  have  information  on  or  to  specify  the  set  of  farm-specific  fixed
factors  not  in  the  y  function.  The  partial  derivatives  of  the  y  function
are  thus  the  effects  of  the  y  inputs  of  profits  in  bad  weather  over  and  above  goodweather  profit  effects.  A  limitation  of  the  data,  however,  is  that  we  do  not
have  information  on  wk beyond  a  dichotomous  good-bad  distinction.  We  thus
estimate  (9),  in  which  the y-function,  normalized  at  w =  1,  is
6  2  2
(10)  y  Zi +E  kj  +  E YTjDt  +  u
ik j=1  j=1  kj  Jj=1
where  Z1  and  Z2  are  dummy  variables  representing  the  presence  of  elderly,
defined  as  individuals  aged  60  or  over,  and  the  presence  of  family  members
between  the  ages  of  40  and  59  and  Z3   is  a  dummy  variable  that  takes  on  the
value  of  one  when  both  elders  and  non-elders  are  present.  Z4  is  the  number
of  individuals  aged  15  and  above  in  the  household,  Z5  is  the  highest  level
of  schooling  attainment  in  the  household,  Z6  is  gross  cropped  area  and  Xkl
and  Xk2  are  dummy  variables  indicating  respectively  the  presence  of  an
agricultural  extension  program  in  the village  and  whether  or  not  the village
is  electrified,  facilitating  irrigation.  The  DTj  are  year  dummies;  u  is
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a  random  error  term.  Taking  the  log  of  (9)  and  substituting  (10),  we  obtain
the  estimating  equation  (11)
B  G
(11)  InrBk= EYjZij  + EYkj  +  yTjDtj  +  (1-8)  Inn  +  u
To  take  into  account  variability  in  'good'  weather  conditions  and  to  reduce
G
measurement  error  in  i.,  we  choose  a  subsample  of  households  experiencing
only  one  adverse  weather  year  out  of  three  sample  years;  r.  is  thus  the
1
average  of  profits  in  the  two  'good'  years.  Our  sample  thus  consists  of
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895  farm  households.  The  first  two  columns  of  Table  1  provide  descriptive
statistics  for  this  subsample.10
If  labor markets are  such that workers of any age can be hired to
agricultural
perform manual/labor, our hypothesis that  farm-specific experience has
a significant payoff in times of adverse weather, given the temporal hetero-
geneity  of  weather  conditions,  implies  that
(12)  Zl-  YZ2 >  0.
Thus, for  given good weather profits, profits  in bad weather will  be higher
when elders are present compared to when family members who are of  lesser
age without  elders are present.  Moreover, in  addition to this ordering by
age,  our  hypothesis  implies  that farm  profits  in  bad  weather  when  there
are elder family members will be no greater when younger individuals are
also present;  with respect to  the returns to  specific experience, the young
will be redundant when there are also old, i.e.,
(13)  YZl >Z  +  Z2 +  Z3
or
(14)  -Z3  > YZ2
Schooling, extension services and electrification are also included
in the y-functions to ascertain if formal education may also contribute
to  allocative efficiency under disequilibrium  states [Schultz,  1975;  Welch,
1970],  in this  case brought about by weather conditions,  and to  estimate
the contributions  to  farm profits  in adverse weather of extension services
and  of the  availability of electricity.
There are three potentially important limitations of  the data which
may affect our measurement of the  returns to specific experience.  First,11
the data contain no information on duration of  land ownership or tenure.
Age  of  family members,  to the extent that  there is  land turnover, is thus
only  an  imperfect  proxy  for  land-specific  experience.  However,  one  impli-
cation of  the specific  experience hypothesis is that such turnover will be
low and negatively correlated with age  (experience).  Evidence on the
relationship between age  and land turnover and on the incidence of  land
sales is  discussed in Section IV.  A second shortcoming of the data is  that
farm profits, while gross  of home-consumed output, are also  reported gross
of the opportunity costs of family labor  (net only of hired labor and other
direct  costs).  Reported profits  in bad weather relative to  good weather could
thus  depend on the total number and age composition of  the family members
if there  are differentials in  good weather-bad weather levels of  family
labor time  supplied on the farm.  Moreover, if  there are transaction costs
associated with hiring labor,  such differential family labor supply responses
to adverse weather conditions could result in family labor  force variables
being correlated with bad-weather profits.  As  a consequence, we include
the  total  number  of  adult  (15+)  family  members  as  well  as  the  age  variables
in  (10)  and  (11).  Rejection  of  the  hypothesis  that  family  size  has  no
effect  on  profits  in  bad  weather  (yZ4  0) would suggest  that  such  dif-
ferential  family  labor supply responses are important.  Non-rejection,
however, would not  rule out  the possibility that  the higher level of  farm
profit  returns  associated  with  the  old  in  bad  weather  reflect  an  increase
in  their on-farm labor effort  during bad weather relative  to younger family
members, although this  is  not an obvious prediction of conventional labor
supply theory.  Note that,  if as assumed implicitly in old-age security
models, the elderly are physically unproductive,  then a positive  age gradient
for profits has  only an informational interpretation.12
A third potential data shortcoming is the absence  of  information on
non-resident  farm workers.  If elderly kin were to  reside nearby rather
than within the  farm household, a possibility not ruled out by the theory,
then the number or presence of elderly in  the household may understate  the
level  of within-family  experience  supplied  to  farm production.  However,
as  shown in Table I, elders (60+) residing outside of extended farm-
households account  for only five percent of all farm households with
elders  and  less  than  a  quarter  of  a  percent  of all  farm  households.
B.  Empirical  Results
Table 2 reports the profit  function estimates for variants of  specifi-
cation  (11).  Estimates for each  y-function specification  excluding  In7G
as a regressor are reported  to illustrate the importance of utilizing the
panel feature of  the data.  As can be seen,  the estimates of all  but the
extension coefficients are quite sensitive to  the exclusion of  farm-specific,
good weather profits.  These results thus suggest that  estimating a profit
function  under  conditions  of  good  weather  from  a  single  cross-section
would be subject to significant bias due to omitted unobservables.  This
also means that we can only estimate the contributions to gross profits  in
bad weather associated with longevity, not the  total contributions to
farm profits  of the experience embodied  in the elderly.  The results, from
row 2, also indicate that when good weather profits are included,  the
number of family workers has no statistically significant or  important
effects on profits  in  bad weather.  Accordingly, we discuss only those results
which "control" for all unobserved fixed factors, as embodied  in  the Inn
term, and which exclude the family  size variable.1113
In  the  specification  in  row  4,  which  assumes  that  the  contributions
to  profits  of  the  young  and  the  elderly  are  independent,  the  hypothesis
embodied  in  (12)  that  elders  contribute  more  than  do  the  young  to  gross
profits  during  bad  weather  conditions  is  supported.  Coefficient  yZI  is
substantially  greater  than yZ2'  although  given  the  extremely  larger  stan-
dard  error  of  YZ2'  the  hypothesis  that  yZl =  YZ2  cannot  be  rejected.
The  point  estimates  indicate  that  when  elders  are  present  bad  weather  farm
profits  are  higher  by  over  14  percent;  the  presence  of  younger  family
members  aged  30-59  adds  less  than  one-half  of  one  percent  to  profits  in
bad  weather.
The  specification  in  row  6  permits  interaction  effects  for  the  young
and  old  and  provides  the  test  of  the  redundancy  hypothesis,  given  by  (14),
that  the  experience-based  contributions  of  the  young  are  nullified  when
elders  are  also  present.  The  estimates  do  not  reject  this  hypothesis  (t=  .49).
The  magnitudes  of  the  coefficients  in  this  less  restrictive  (and  preferred)
specification  imply  that  profits  in  bad  weather  are  augmented  by  34  percent
when  there  are  only  elderly,  are  higher  by  14  percent  when  there  are  only
persons  above  age  39  and  less  than  60,  but  are  higher  by  21  percent  when
both  elders  and  the  "young"  aged  40-59  are  together  in  the  same  household.
Thus,  farm  profits  in  bad  weather  are  7  percent  higher  for  joint  (old-young)
households  compared  to  households  without  elders.
The  age-structure  parameter  estimates  suggest  that  the  expected  annual
pecuniary  contribution  to  farm  profits  derived  from  the  experience  of
a  family  member  over  age  60,  given  the  sample  mean  probability  of  adverse
weather  of  one  every  three  years,  is,  assuming  no  other  productivity,  approx-
imately  81  to  230  rupees.  Based  on  the  total  earnings  of  non-farm  (wage-14
earning) agricultural households with two adults and four children  in the
data set,  this experiential contribution of an elder alone would represent
a 37  to  99 percent offset to the annual average consumption of a rural,
prime-aged adult.12
Of  the other  coefficients,  the estimates  of  8  suggest  that  on  average
adverse weather reduces the marginal contributions  of fixed  factors by
approximately  19  percent.  The  specifications  in  row  4  and  6  also  indicate
that the payoffs to experience in bad weather are comparable to  those assoc-
iated with general training, as provided by formal schooling, and with
infrastructural factors.  A year of  schooling appears to augment bad weather
profits by 8.5 percent, while both the presence of an extension facility
and  of  electrification  which  facilitates  irrigation  [Singh,  1977],  indepen-
dently increase profits by approximately 13 percent under adverse weather
conditions.
Our  method  of  estimating  the weather-related  payoffs  to  the  farm-specific
experience  of  the  old,  as  was  discussed,  obviates  the  need  for  data  on
the complete set of farm-specific profit factors.  The  y-function estimates
will be biased, however,  if  there are any omitted variables that are particu-
larly or differentially useful  in bad weather and  thus which affect adverse-
weather farm profits relative to good weather profits.  If  such omitted fac-
tors are  important,  our results are open to an alternative  interpretation
which views the age-structure of  the family as a function of  bad-weather
profits, given farm profitability in good weather.  A reverse relationship
might exist, given such omitted factors,  if a) family-extension  is a consump-
tion good,  subject to the usual income effects and/or  b) the survival of
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elders  is responsive to income levels  (in bad weather).15
With  respect  to  the  income-effect  hypothesis,  the  estimated  family
age-structure  coefficients,  given  the  reverse  interpretation,  would  suggest
that  both  family  extension  and  elders  living  alone  are  "normal"  goods,
with  the  latter  family  type  a  superior  good  relative  to  family  extension.
In  section  IV,  however,  we  present  estimates  of  profit  effects  on  family
structure  which  show  no  significant  relationships  between  the  predicted
level  of  profits  and  family  extension.
The  ordering  of  the  age  structure  coefficients  in  the  specification
in  row  6  may  be  supportive  of  a  mortality  hypothesis  which  assumes  that,
for  given  incomes,  elders  are  more  likely  to  survive  when  living  with
younger  family  members  than  when  alone.  While  we  could  not  reject  our  hypo-
thesis  that  profits  are  identical  in  households  consisting  solely  of  elders
and  containing  both  elders  and  the  young,  the  point  estimates  are  consis-
tent  with  the  hypothesis  that  low  bad-weather  incomes  select  out  more
severely  elders  living  alone  compared  to  elders  living  with  their  offspring.
To  reduce  the  likelihood  of  omitting  other  bad  weather  profit-aug-
menting  factors,  we  added  58  district  dummy  variables  to  the  specification
in  row  6.  These  will  capture  any  district-specific  differences  in  both
contemporaneous  weather  conditions  and  factors  which  affect  farm profits
in  bad  weather,  at  the  expense  of  degrees  of  freedom.  Estimates  from
this  regression  are  reported  in  row  7.  As  can  be  seen,  while  the  age-struc-
ture  parameter  estimates  are  less  precise,  the  point  estimates  now  more
closely  conform  to  the  experience  hypothesis--profits  in  bad  weather  are
higher  by  12  percent  when  the  "young"  aged  40-59  are  alone  and  are  increased
by  17  percent  when  there  are  family  members  over  60,  regardless  of  whether
or  not  elders  are  living  alone  or  with  younger  kin.  The  approximate  equality16
of  the  bad-weather  profit  "effects"  of  experience  in  the  joint  and  non-joint
households  containing  elders  is  not  an  obvious  implication  of  either  the
income  or mortality-selection  hypotheses.
IV.  Specific  Experience,  Family  Structure  and  Land  Sales
A.  Land  Sales
In  this  section  we  test  the  implications  of  the  existence  of  returns
to  specific  experience  for  land  market  transactions.  The  land-based  speci-
ficity  of  such  returns  implies  that  market  turnover  of  land  will  be  low  (and
thus  age  and  specific  experience  highly  correlated)  even  if  there are  no
market  barriers  to  land  sales.  Moreover,  agents  with  experience  on  a  given
parcel  of  land  will  suffer  greater  capital  losses  from  market  sales  of  land
(at  price  p)  than  will  agents  with less  experience  on  otherwise  identical
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landholdings.  Elders  owning  land  are  thus  likely  to  enter  into  long-term
(lifetime)  implicit  contracts  with  the  young  to  capitalize  these  experience
gains,  even  when  their  offspring  are  unavailable  (have  died  or migrated).
If  the  experience  returns  are  shared  intergenerationally,  both  the  younger
and  older  generations  in  families  whose  members  are  joined  in  an  implicit/land
labor  contract,  whatever  their  experience  or  age-composition,  will  thus
also  suffer  a  capital  loss  from  sales  of  land  to  non-family  agents.  As  a
consequence,  we  would  expect  that:
1.  families  with  elder  (experienced)  members  are  less  likely  to
sell  land  compared  to  families  without  elders;
2.  few  elders  will  be  in  non-intergenerationally  extended  households; 1 5
3.  intergenerationally  extended  families,  independent  of  their
age-composition,  are  less  likely  to  sell  land  compared  to
non-intergenerationally  extended  families;17
4.  the age-composition of  intergenerationally extended families does
not  influence the likelihood of  selling  land.
If the  stock  of  land  were  a  capital  asset  whose  value  did  not  have
a specific experience component, we would  expect that  landholdings would
be decumulated according  to some life-cycle optimnization scheme, with or with-
out  bequests.  Thus,  in  the  absence  of  a  well-developed  alternative  model
of  savings providing a specific optimal age path for asset holdings, the
non-rejection  of  hypothesis  1 is  less  conclusive  than  the  non-rejection  of
hypotheses  2  through  4.  However,  whatever  the  size  of  the  specific  experience
return, we would expect  to observe evidence of asset behavior  if  a market  for
land  exists, in particular, the decumulation  of landholdings by households  in
response to  sufficiently severe transitory declines in  income caused by
weather  adversity  or  other  exogenous  factors.
Households  faced  with  the  prospect  of  experientially-related  capital
losses  resulting from adverse weather will undertake risk-reducing measures
and those more able  to  reduce  income risk will also be less  likely to sell
land.  One family extension hypothesis [Cain,  1981]  emphasizes the superior
ability of larger families to  diversify sources of income and  thus to  reduce
income  risk  arising  from  weather  fluctuations  without  sacrificing  the  returns
to  individual occupational  specialization.  While this hypothesis  is  silent
about the  desirability of  the prevalent vertical extended  fomor on  age struc-
ture,  it  does  imply that  the number of  adults,  for given  family  structure,
should also be associated negatively with the probability of  land divestiture.18
The  ARIS  data  indicate  whether  or  not  owners  of  land  have  sold  any  land
in  the  last  survey  round,1970-1971.  Because  of  the very  low  incidence  of
land  sales  (an  implication  of  the  theory)  and  the  potential  importance  of
weather  adversity  (confirmed  below)  and  in  order  to  control  for  good  weather
profits,  we  selected  a  subsample  of  land-owning  households  who  had  experienced
adverse  weather  in  either  or  both  of  1969-1970  and  1970-1971,  yielding  a  sample
size  of  1,23.  The  third  and  fourth  columns  of  Table  I  report  the  sample  sta-
tistics  for  this  group.  Their  comparability  with  those  of  the  prior  subsample
is  consistent  with  the  lack  of  selection  bias  associated  with  weather-condi-
tioned  sampling,  since  the  sub-sample  overlap  is  small.  As  can  be  seen,  in
both  samples  less  than  1.75  percent  of  land-owning  farm  families  sold  land
in  the  sample  year,  and  intergenerationally  extended  families  (at  least  two  gen-
erations  of  kin  aged  20  and  above)  constitute  about  60  percent  of  the  farm
households.  Consistent  with  hypothesis- two,  almost  all  (99.5  percent)
households  with  elders  in  both  samples  also  contain  members  of  the  next
generation  of  kin.16
To  test  the  first,  age-structure,  hypothesis  we  estimate  the  equation
2  4
(15)  Li  =  a  + E  Zj  +w  W  +  6  k  +  vi
j=l  zjij  wi  J=1  ij
where  Li  takes  on  the  value  of  one  if  there is  any  land  sold  in  1970-71,
Z1  and  Z2  are  dummy  variables  corresponding  respectively  to  the  presence
of  elders  over  60  and  family  members  aged  40-59,  and  o  is  a  dummy  variable
which  takes  on  the  value  of  one  if  the  village  experienced  adverse  weather
in  consecutive  years  1969-70  and  1970-71.  The  4  k.  "control"  variables
(variables  which  may  influence  land  sales  but  whose  effects  are  not  indicated
by  the  specific  experience  theory)  consist  of  the  number  of  adults  in  the
household,  the  log  of  adult  per  capita  good  weather  farm19
profits  (1968-69  profits),  the  highest  level  of  educational  attainment  in
the  household,  and  a  village  electrification  dummy  variable.
To  test jointly  hypotheses  three  and  four,  we  estimate  the  equation:
3  4
(16)  Li  =  a  +Ebf  fi  +  bwwi  +EdKi  +  v2,
where  fl,  f2, and  f3 are  dummy  variables  corresponding  respectively  to  families
with  elders  (60+)  but  which  are not  intergenerationally  extended  (one  genera-
tion  of  adult  kin  only),  families  which  are  intergenerationally  extended,
and  families  which  are both  extended  intergenerationally  and  contain  elders.
Hypothesis  1,  3,  and  4  imply  respectively  that  1f <0,  bf 2  <  0,  and
bf  =  0.
Table  m  reports  estimates  of  the  land  sales  equations  obtained  using
maximum  likelihood  logit,  including  and  excluding  the  set  of  control  variables.
While  the  set  of  control  variables  are  only  marginally  significant,  the
adverse  weather  coefficients  are  highly  significant  in  all  specifications,
indicating  that  farm  families  experiencing  two  consecutive  years  of  bad
weather  were  150  percent  more  likely  than  other  families  to  sell  their  land
(bad  weather  in  either  1969-70  or  1970-71  alone,  however,  was  not  statistis-
tically significantly  related  to  the  probability  of  land  sales).  Thus,  the
land  market  appears to function,  in  the  sense  that  households  are  able  to
liquidate  holdings  when  incomes  are  low.  However,  relatively  severe  conditions
are  required  before  households  will  participate  in  the  land  market,  consis-
tent  with  the  specificity  of  experience  returns.20
In specifications 1 through 3, variants of equation  (15),  the results
support the hypothesis  that families with elders are significantly less
likely  than  other  households  - by  90  to  97  percent  - to  transfer  land  through
the market, whether or not per-capita profits or the number of household
adults (specification  3), are held constant.  Specifications 4 through 6 reveal,
however, that,  as implied by the specific experience model, the age-composition/
land  sales  relationship  is  spurious,  since  almost  all  elders  reside  in  inter-
generationally  extended  families  and  intergenerationally  extended  families
are  significantly  less  likely  to  sell their  land,  whether  or not  elders  are
present.  Indeed, intergenerational structure  (but not age-composition),  apart
from  transitory weather  conditions,  is  the  strongest  correlate  of  land  sales
even when family size  is included among the regressors --  at  the sample means,
a  doubling  of  per-capita  farm  income  and  an  increase  in  schooling  by  one  year
change  the probability  of  a  market  sale  of  land  by  only  0.0031  (18 percent
decrease)  and  0.0021  (12  percent  increase)  respectively,  while  inter-
generational extension,  for given  family size,is associated with a decrease
of  0.0136  (80  percent)  in  the probability  of  a  land  sale.  Family  size  also
has  a  significant  negative  effect  on  the  land  sale  probability,  as  hypothesized.
The addition of one family member over age  15  reduces  the probability of a
land sale by  0.0052,  or by  30 percent.  Electrification, the strongest non-
family,  non-weather  correlate  reduces  land  sales  as  well,  by  0.0047  or 28 percent.
While  the  negative  and  significant  effects  of  age  and  intergenerational
structure are supportive of the  specific experience hypothesis,  the negative
and significant effect of family size on  land sales,as was noted, also lends
support to the occupational diversification explanation  for extended families.
This  latter finding thus suggests the possibility that the intergenerational21
structure effect  may  merely  reflect  the  optimality  of  a  diverse  age-
structure forintrafamily  income  diversification.  To  investigate  more  directly
the  independent  roles  of  structure and  size  in  diversification,  we  (arbitrarily)
assumed  that optimal  diversification  for  farm households  is  characterized  by
one-half  of  total  income  having  a  non-agricultural  source  (salaries,  non-
farm  self-employment,  non-agricultural  wages).8  We  regressed  the  absolute
value  of  the  deviation  of  the non-farm/  income  ratio  from 0.5  (dev)  on
family  size  (adults),  intergenerational  extension  (extension),  schooling,
electrification  and  total  land  owned  (land).  Negative  coefficients  are  thus
associated  with  increased  diversification.  The  coefficient  estimates
obtained  were:
(17)  dev  =  0.590  - 0.0114  *  adults  +  0.0121-extension  +  0.0495-schooling
(18.3)  (2.69)  (0.79)  (11.6)
- 0.0632-electrification  - 0.00353-land  F  =  27.12
(4.45)  (6.88)  R  =  .07
where  t-ratios  are  in  parentheses.  As  can  be  seen,  while  family  size  has  the
hypothesized  effect  on  income  diversification  and  is  statistically  significant,
intergenerational  structure  has  no  significant  effect  on  the  degree  of
diversification.  The  negative  and  significant  family  structure effect  on  the
probability  of  a  land  sale  thus  does  not  appear  to  be  due  to  structure  facili-
tating  income  diversification.
B.  Family  Structure  and  Expected  Weather  Variability
In  this  section  we  devise  a  method  to  test  the  implications  of  the  pos-
itive  farm  profit-age  gradient  during  periods  of  adverse  weather,  estimated
in  section  III,  for  the  spatial  variation  in  the  prevalence  of  the  intergenera-
tional  extension  of  families.  In  particular,  if  the  returns  to  farm  or22
family-specific  experience  are  augmented  by  weather  variability,  intergenera-
tionally  extended  families  should  be  more  frequently  observed  where  such
variability  is  greatest.  Implementation  of  this test  is  straightforward
as  long  as  the  concept  of  weather  variability  can  be  operationalized.
Unfortunately,  weather  has  many  characteristics,  e.g.,  rainfall,  temperature,
and  the  relationship  between  the variability  of  weather-and  the  distribution-
al parameters  of  these  individual  characteristics  is  not  known  a  priori.
To  fix  ideas,  let  weather variability  be  the  only  determinant
of  family  structure  in  the  sense  that  it  is  orthogonal  to  all  other  deter-
minants.  Thus
(18)  F  aV  +  u
where  F  measures  the  prevalence  of  the  extended  family,  V  weather  variabil-
ity  and  u  all  other  determinants.  Further,  let  there  be  available  a  particu-
lar characteristic  (or  vector  of  characteristics)  of  weather,  say rainfall,
that  measures  weather  variability  with  error,  i.e.,
(19)  R  =  yV  + e
where  R  denotes  rainfall  and  E(cu)  =  0.  Notice  that  the  sign  of y  may  be
unknown  so  that  rainfall  measures  alone  cannot  be  used  above  to  identify
the  sign  of  a.  An  additional  relationship  which  can  be  exploited  is  that
between  profit  variability  and  weather  variability.  Let
(20)  r'  =  BV  +  6  8  >  0  ,
where  r'  is  a  measure  of  profit  variability  and  the  random  component  6
contains,  among  other  things,  the  fixed  factors  discussed  in  the  preceding23
section.  The  relationship  between  family  structure  and  profit  variability
derived  from  this  system  is  given  by
a  ,  a6
(21)  F  =  - 7r   +  u.
Estimation  of  (21)  by  OLS  clearly  leads  to  biased  and  inconsistent  estimates
of  since  r'  is  correlated  with  6.  However,  w'  may  be  written  as
(22)  ='  - R--+  6
Y  Y
from  (19)  and  (20).  As  long  as  E(c6)  =  0,  ~a/  can  be  estimated  consistently
(though  not  efficiently)  by  a  two  stage  procedure  in  which  (22)  is  estimated
by  OLS  and  the  predicted  values  of  w'  are  then  substituted  into  (21)  in
a  second  stage  regression.  Since  8  is  positive,  our  hypothesis  that  a  >  0
is  confirmed  if  the  second  stage  regression  coefficient  on  7' is  positive.
To  implement  this  procedure,  we  again  exploit  the  panel  characteristic
of  the  survey  data,  which  provides  farm  profits  for  each  of  3  years,  and  the
availability  of  30  years  (1921-1950)  of  monthly  data  on  days  of  rain  and
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rainfall  levels  for  each  of  73  of  100  districts  covered  in  the  NCAER  survey.
The  first  three  central  moments  for  each  rain variable  distribution  were
computed  for  the  four  critical  planting  and  harvesting  months,  June,  July,
September,  and  October.  There  are  thus  a  total  of  24  rainfall  variables  for
each  district.  The  mean  and  (intertemporal)  variance  of  farm  profits  over
the  three-year  period  1969-1971  for  each  individual  farm  in  the  sample  were
also  computed.  Table IVprovides  the  district-level  sample  characteristics
for  the  means  and  variances  of  farm  profits  aggregated  from  the  household
survey  data  and  for  the  rainfall  characteristics.  As  can  be  seen  from24
the  table,  there  is  considerable  interdistrict  variation  in  both  the  character-
istics  of  the  rainfall  distributions  and  in  the within-farm  variability  and
levels  of  profits  across  the  Indian  districts.
To  test  whether  the  level  of  wealth  in  addition  to  profit variability
influences  family  structure,  the  predicted  mean  of  farm  profits  r,  predicted
with the  same  rainfall  instruments,  is  also  included  in  (23).  The  two-stage
least  squares  estimates,  utilizing  both  the  predicted  mean  and  variance  of
profits  are: 2 0
(23)  F  =  0.516  +  0.001H(xl0 - 3 )+0.002'(xl-
5 )  n  =  73,
(8.26)  (0.10)  (1.89)
where  F  =  proportion  of  intergenerationally  extended  farm  families.
The  results  indicate  that  there  is  a  statistically  significant  positive  rela-
tionship  between  predicted  (or  weather-induced)  profit  variance  and  inter-
generational  family  extension,  consistent  with  the  implications  of  the
specific  experience  hypothesis.  There  is  also  a  positive  but  very  impre-
cisely  estimated  effect  of  mean  profits;  the  expected  level  of  wealth  does
not  appear  to  account  for  the  variations  in  family  structure.
V.  Conclusion
While  there  has  been  a  recent  growth  in  theoretical  attention  to  econ-
nomic  relationships  between  generations  and  to  family  arrangements,  there
remains  a  paucity  of  empirical  research  on  these  important  and  universal
phenomena.  The  major  purpose  of  this  paper  has  been  to  test  the  hypothesis
that  in  a  traditional  agricultural  setting  family-specific  information  pro-
vides  an  explanation  for  the  coexistence  of  intergenerationally  extended25
families,  land  transfers  outside  of  impersonal  markets  and  within  families,
and  discrepancies  between  the  cost  of  hired  and  family  labor.  We  obtained
evidence  based  on  longitudinal  household  data  from  India  that  the  gross  returns
from  specific  knowledge  as  embodied  in  older  household  members  under  condi-
tions  of  adverse  weather  were  greater  than  those  associated-with  younger
household  members,  economically  significant,  and  comparable  to  those  from
schooling.  We  also  found,  consistent  with  the  existence  of  returns  to
specific  experience,  that  market  sales  of  land  were  infrequent  and  signifi-
cantly  less  likely  among  families  with elders  and  intergenerationally  extend-
ed  families,  and  that  the  cross-sectional  variation  in  the  prevalance  of  intergenera-
tionally  extended  farm  families  was  significantly  and  positively  related  to  weather-
induced  profit  variability.  These  phenomena  did  not  appear  readily  explicable
by  prior  theories  of  the  extended  family,  which  take  the  absence  of  asset
markets  as  given,  although  such models  have  not  been  rigorously  formulated
in  terms  of  their  testable  implications.
In  this  paper  we  have  focused  narrowly  upon  a  particular  variant  of  the
specific  experience  hypothesis  in  order  to  facilitate  testing.  Our  empirical
results,  which  lend  support  to  the  hypothesis  that  returns  to  specific  experi-
ence  associated  with  land  make  optimal  intrafamily  and  intergenerational
transfers  of  land  and  joint  production  of  that  land  among  farm  families  able
to  successfully  allocate  the  rents  from  such  implicit  intergenerational
contracts,  thus  help  explain  why  the  proportion  of  farm  families  who  are  inter-
generationally  extended  is  high  and  exceeds  by  25  percent  the  proportion  in
the  population  of  non-farm  families  residing  in  a  country  such  as  India.
However,  the  relatively  high .incidence  of  intergenerational  extension  in  the
latter  group  suggests  that  the  specific  experience  hypothesis  is  not  sufficient26
to explain all variations in  family structure and size.  Indeed, our empirical
results also provide some support  for the hypothesis that family extension
(but not  intergenerational extension) facilitates occupational diversi-
fication and thus serves to reduce income risk.  Moreover, while sufficient
to  explain  the  optimality  of  the  spatial  proximity  (and  immobility)  of
family  generations  owning  land,  our  theory  is  not  sufficient  to account
for co-residence  of those  generations, although such co-residence evidently
dominates.  Theories of family extension based on the advantages of income
pooling4nd intrafamily transfers  in the presence  of risk, however, are neither
sufficient  to  explain  the  proximity  of  family  members  nor  co-residence.
Attention  to  the  returns  to  experience  may  also  be  useful,  however,
in  understanding  the  broader  issues  of  cross-cultural  variation  in  family
structure and transfers as they are  related to industrialization and
urbanization.  For  example,  consider  the  impact  on  the  family  of  introducing
new technologies.  Almost definitionally, the return to accumulated knowledge
is  reduced  and  the  specific  experience  hypothesis  would,  therefore,  predict
a decline in extended family  formation and an increase in market  transfers
21
of land.  The possibility of significant returns to experience which may
be specific to land plots or areas in traditional agriculture may also have
implications for the  success of policies involving the redistribution or
consolidation  of  land.  First,  farmers  offered  a  "fair" market  price  or
land  of  equal  (market)  value  in  exchange  for  their landholdings  may  be  reluc-
tant  to  participate  where  the  specificity  of  their  experience  and  the  returns
to  such  experience  are  high.  Thus,  non-coercive  land  consolidation  schemes
may  be  more  successful  when  technological  change has been significant.
Second,  any  mandated  land  transfers,  even  if  only  among  farmers,  may  be
accompanied  by  losses  in  output  resulting  from  the  loss  of  (specific)27
experience returns,  especially if  owners can no longer farm  (as tenants
or  managers)  their  former  landholdings.  Thus,  the  short-run  net  gains  from
such  schemes  may  differ  from  their  long-run  effects.  The  further  study  of
the  role  of  managerial  experience  and  land  turnover  among  farmers  in  tra-
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Footnotes
*  Earlier  versions  of  this  paper were  given  at  Yale  University,  the  Uni-
versity of Chicago, the University  of Minnesota, the University of Michigan;
the  National  Council  of  Applied  Economic  Research,  Delhi,  and  ICRISAT,
Hyderabad.  The authors learned much from these seminars as well as  from
the referees.
1.  In rural India, for example, 62 percent  of all  farm househoods in  1970-
1971  contained  at  least  two  generations  of  adult  (over  20)  kin,  while  adult
siblings  resided  together  in  only  7.5  percent  of  all households  (NCAER-ARIS
survey, described below).
2.  The  cost  advantage  of  family  over hired  labor  has  often  been  inferred
from the well-documented labor intensity of small  farms compared to  larger
farms  in  South  Asia,  and  the  predominance  of  intrafamily  over  market  trans-
actions  in land, reflected in the immobility of farm households  in these
settings,  has  also  been  noted  --  in  1971,  only  about  10  percent  of  all  adult
rural  males  in  India  did  not  live  in  the village  in  which  they  were  born
[Weiner,  1978].
3.  The  concept  of  specific  training  was  originally  usedby  Becker  [1964  1
to  explore  firm-employee  wage  and  employment  relationships.
4.  Our  analysis  thus  clearly  only  pertains  to  land-scarce  economies.
5.  We assume that  a child makes no decisions  for himself;  parents have
incentives to retain their children's labor on the  farm since  this serves  to
perpetuate the intergenerational transfer scheme;  thus a  >  0.  For evidence
that  the off-farm (wage labor) participation rate of children in  farm house-
holds is  low and significantly less  than that in landless households, while
overall labor force participation rates are similar, see Rosenzweig  [1981].31
6.  Note  that  the  payment  by  the  young  c  would  only  be  bid  up  to  c*  if
parents  not  owning  or  working  on  plot  A  offered  bribes  to  the  adults  residing
on  A  to  provide  first-period  "experience"  and  A,at  price  p,  in  period  3  to
their  children  instead  of  to  "own"  children.  Since  the  non-A  parents  could
not  capture  any  of  the  returns  from  this  contract,  such  bidding  would  be
purely  altruistic.  Moreover,  as  long  as  parents -do derive  utility  from  increas-
ing  the welfare  of  own  children  (as  opposed  to  that  of  other  children),  the
bribe  offered  would  have  to  exceed  E*.  Empirical  evidence  (see  note  5)  suggests
that  such  interfamily  transfers  of  young  children  are  not  prevalent,  when
there  are  any  own  offspring.  When  offspring  are  not  available  for  or
amenable  to  the  contract,  there  are  still  incentives  for  the  old  landowner
to  enter  into  the  labor-land  arrangement  with  young  who  have  had  the  most
experience  on  the  land.  See  notel 6 .
7.  At  the  theoretical  level,  techniques  might  exist  for  augmenting  the
impact  on  profits  of  extraordinarily  good  weather  as  well,  assuming  a  tri-
chotomous  variable,  good,  normal,  bad.  The  modelling  could  be  done  in  terms
of  deviations  from  normal  weather  in  either  direction,  possibly  with  asymmetries
in  allocative  gains.  To  the  extent  that  good  weather  in  the  dichotomous
case  contains  a  component  of  good  weather  in  the  trichotomous  case,  the
estimated  contribution  of  elders  in  bad  weather  would  be  dependent  upon  the
proportion  of  good  weather  years  that  are  extraordinarily  good,  if  there  were
payoffs  to  experience  in  those  latter  states  of  nature.
8.  Year  effects  account  both  for  differences  in  output  price  and  in  weather
adversity  that  are  related  to  calendar  time.32
9.  Given  the  logarithmic  representation,  farms  with negative  or  zero  profits
in  any  of  the  three  years  were  excluded.  Because,  however,  reported  profits
are  gross  of  own  labor  input  costs,  only  30households  (about  3  percent  of
the  sample)  had  to  be  excluded  on  this  basis.
10.  Whether or not  any individual  increases or decreases his/her on-farm
labor supply under adverse weather conditions would depend on the direction of
weather  effects  on on-farm  returns  to  labor  effort  and  on  the  covariation
between such returns and those  available off the farm.  To predict age differ-
ences in  such sectoral allocations across weather states would require hypo-
theses  about age-specific differences in these return parameters and possibly
in  preferences.
11.  None  of  the  reported  results  are  altered  significantly  when  family  size
or  the number of  adults is  included  in the  specifications; coefficient  standard
errors  are  slightly  lower  when  this variable  is  excluded.
12.  This  computation  is  based  on  sample  mean  estimates  of  248  and  143  days
of market employment and daily agricultural wage rates of  2.5 and  2.0 rupees
for  adult  males  and  females  and  assumes  that  children  consume  on  average  one-
half  the  adult  level  of  consumption.  For  details,  see  Rosenzweig  [1981  .
13.  The  results  are  also consistent, of course, with the hypothesis that
individuals  of  higher  ability  (to  cope  with  adverse  weather)  have  greater  life
expectancies.  This longevity-ability correlation, however,  would not appear
to  account  in any obvious way  for  the relationships between  family structure,
land  sales and  profit variance discussed  in Section IV.33
14.  The  specific  experience  framework  suggests  that  if  reductions  in  income
make  "necessary"  the  sale  of  the  land  to  non-kin,  both  the  buyer  and  seller  of
the  land  gain  from  the  sellercontinuing  to  participate  in  the  farming  of
that  land.  This  would  reduce  the  capital  loss  to  the  seller  associated  with
his  specific  experience.  However,  only  if  the  buyer  agreed  to  allow  the  off-
spring  and  all  future  generations  to  continue  to  farm  the  land  once  the  elder
had  died  would  there  be  no  loss  to  the  family  (or  society).  Land  ownership
is  not  necessary  for  the  optimality  of  intergenerational  co-production  and
experienced-based  intergenerational  contracts.
15.  The  overlapping  generations  model  with  specific  experience  suggests  only
the  optimality  of  generations  working  together  on  the  same  plots  of  land  and
thus  of  intergenerational  proximity.  Costs  and  benefits  of  co-residence,
given  the  optimality  of  proximity,  must  be  invoked  to  explain  living  arrangements.
Note  that  theories  of  family  extension  which  link  family  members  by  financial
transfers  (occupational  diversification,  old-age  security)  are  not  sufficient
to  explain  either  proximity  or  co-residence.  Indeed,  migration  cum  remittances
pools  risk  efficiently  but  entails  non-co-residence.
16.  In  23  percent  of  intergenerationally  extended  families  with  elders,  the
young  generation  contained  neither  the  elder's  sons,  daughters,  grandsons
or  granddaughters  (aged  over  20).  Of  this  group,  the  principal  relationships
of  the  young  to  the  elders  were  niece/nephew  and  son  or  daughter-in-law.
We  have  also  categorized  families  as  extended  if  there  are  adult  kin  of  any
"generation"  who  are  20  or  more  years  younger  than  the  eldest  household
member;  5  percent  of  the  elder-extended  households  contain  very  much
younger  brothers  or  brother's-in-law  of  the  elder.  Exclusion  of  this  set
of  families  from  this  category  makes  the  negative  effect  on  land  sales  of
elder-non-extended  families  slightly  more  significant  (t  =0.98)  and  does  not
reduce  the  magnitude  or  significance  of  the  extended  family  effect.34
17.  Another  testable  implication  of  the  profit-augmenting  effects  of  (speci-
fic)  experience  in  adverse  weather  is  that  the  Impact  of  adverse  weather
on  the  sale  of  land  will  be  diminished  among  households  with  elders.  Because
there  are  only  31  households  with  elders  who  had  experienced  two  consecutive
years  of  adverse  weather  in  our  sample,  however,  no  statistical  test  of  this
proposition  is  possible  with  our  data.  None  of  these  households  in  fact
sold  any  of  their  land.
18.  The  sample  mean  non  farm/ototal  income  ratio  is  0.37.
19.  Rainfall  is  critical  to  agriculture  in  India,as  over  75  percent  of
cultivated  area  is  rainfed  (see  J.  Singh:,  [1974]).
20.  Results  obtained  for  the first-stage  profit  mean  and  variance  reduced-
form  equations  involving  the  twenty-four  rainfall  distribution  variables
are  available  from  the  authors  on  request.
21.  Societies  characterized  by  "intensive  agriculture  with  irrigation"
have  a  lower  incidence  of  extended  family  arrangements  [  Lee, 1977  ].  This
is  consistent  with  our  profit  function  finding  that  electrification  reduces
the  impact  of  adverse  weather  on  profits  and  thus  may  substitute  for  the
services  of  elders.Table I
Means and  Standard Deviations:  Farm Households in Weather-Based
Subsamples, 1968-1971
Variable
Farm  profits  in  good  weather  (rupees)
Farm  profits  in  adverse  weather  (rupees)
Sold  land  in  1970-71
Presence  of  family  members  60+
Presence  of  family  members  60+,
non-extended  family
Presence  of  family  members  40-59
Intergenerationally  extended  family
Intergenerationally  extended  family
with  elders  (60+)
Number  of  family  members  15+
Highest  education
Village  extension  program
Village  electrification
Adverse  weather  in  1968-69
Adverse  weather  in  1969-71
Adverse  weather  in  1970-71
Adverse  weather  in  consecutive  years
(1969-71)
Number  of  households
Subsample
Adverse  weather  in  Good weather in
one-year only  1968-69
Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.
3970.9  3691.6  3543.4  2957.8
3462.3  4106.8-
.0123  - .0171
.418  - .387
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Z I  . -TableIV
Means  and  Standard  Deviations:  District  Rainfall  Levels  and  Variability  From
1921  to  1950  For  Selected  Months  and Annual  Farm  Profit  Variability  1969-1971
(standard  deviations  in  parentheses)
Variable  June  July  September  October
Mean  Days  of  Rain 1921-1950  7.18
(4.22)
Mean Rainfall  (cm) 1921-1950  150.0
(130.8)
Variance  in  Days  of  Rain  1921-1950  10.7
(5.0)
Variance  in  Rainfall  1921-1950  10710
(9299)
Skewness  in  Days  of  Rain  1921-1950 0434
(0.497)
Skewness in Rainfall 1921-1950  1.26
(0.811)
Mean Farm Profits  1969-1971
Variance  in  Farm Profits  (xl0- 3)  1969-1971
Number of Districts
13.69  8.39
(4.55)  (3.42)
301.2  175.3
(129.2)  (83.0)
13.9  11.9
(5.7)  (3.8)
20006  11887
(16561)  (7012)
0.004  0.299
(0.432)  (0.651)
0.788  1.07
(0.694)  (0.856)
3600
(1919)
11445
(13395)
73
3.57
(3.63)
64.3
(61.3)
14.3
(7.8)
5288
(9400)
0.966
(0.657)
1.66
(0.859)